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blessed with the intelligence to figure out how to survive in an environment
where we are not physically the strongest, fastest or best-protected animals.
That same intelligence can be stretched to include a world-based empathy
for the environment, "beneficent" in Parfit's sense.
We should not limit our actions to those we are able to determine now as
directly or indirectly benefiting ourselves or our descendants. Rather, we
should cultivate our natural sense of obligation not to act wastefully or
wantonly even when we cannot calculate how such acts would make any
present or future persons worse off.25 There is good evidence that customary international law-with various fits and starts and setbacks-is moving
generally in this direction, perhaps responding to a deep and inarticulate
sense that human beings are not in confrontation with, but rather belong to,
their natural environment. That such law is currently given the label
"human rights" should not constrict our understanding of what it is or
where it is going.
ANTHONY

D'AMATO*

OUR RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS TO FUTURE
GENERATIONS FOR THE ENVIRONNIENT
This we know: the earth does not belong to man: man belongs to
the earth.

. .

. Whatever befalls the earth, befalls the sons of the

earth. Man did not weave the web of life: he is merely a strand in it.
Whatever he does to the web, he does to himself.
Chief Seattlet

We read every day about the desecration of our environment and the
mismanagement of our natural resources. We have always had the capacity
to wreck the environment on a small or even regional scale. Centuries of
irrigation without adequate drainage in ancient times converted large areas
of the fertile Tigris-Euphrates valley into barren desert. What is new is that
we now have the power to change our global environment irreversibly, with
profoundly damaging effects on the robustness and integrity of the planet
and the heritage that we pass to future generations.
In Fairness to Future Generationsargues that we, the human species, hold
the natural environment of our planet in common with all members of our
25 This would be a pure example of deontological ethics in Kant's sense. For a brief discussion and references, see D'Amato & Eberle, Three Models of Legal Ethics, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J.
761, 772-73 (1983) ("a deontological theory of ethics says that some acts are morally obligatory regardless of their consequences for human happiness").
* Of the Board of Editors.
t Letter from Chief Seattle, patriarch of the Duwamish and Squamish Indians of Puget
Sound, to U.S. President Franklin Pierce (1855). Although the letter appears in numerous
anthologies, the original has never been located.
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species: past generations, the present generation, and future generations.'
As members of the present generation, we hold the earth in trust for future
generations. At the same time, we are beneficiaries entitled to use and
benefit from it.
There are two relationships that must shape any theory of intergenerational equity in the context of our natural environment: our relationship to
other generations of our own species and our relationship to the natural
system of which we are a part.2
The human species is integrally linked with other parts of the natural
system; we both affect and are affected by what happens in the system. The
natural system, contrary to popular belief, is in many ways a hostile one.
Deserts, glaciers, volcanoes, tsunamis can bring havoc to our species. Moreover, the natural environment can be toxic to our species, as through the
natural toxicity of some plants and animals or the dramatic release of toxic
clouds of carbon dioxide from Lake Nyos in the Cameroon, which killed
1,700 people. On the other hand, the natural system makes life possible for
us. It gives us the resources with which to survive and to improve human
welfare.
Our actions affect the natural system. We alone among all living creatures
have the capacity to shape significantly our relationship to the environment.
We can use it on a sustainable basis or we can degrade environmental quality
and the natural resource base. As part of the natural system, we have no
right to destroy its integrity; nor is it in our interest to do so. Rather, as the
most sentient of living creatures, we have a special responsibility to care for
the planet.
The second fundamental relationship is that between different generations of the human species. All generations are inherently linked to other
generations, past and future, in using the common patrimony of earth.3
To define intergenerational equity, it is useful to view the human community as a partnership among all generations. In describing a state as a partnership, Edmund Burke observed that "as the ends of such a partnership
cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only
between those who are living but between those who are living, those who
I E. BROWNWEISS,IN FAIRNESSTO FUTUREGENERATIONS:
INTERNATIONAL
LAW, COMMONPATRIMONY
AND INTERGENERATIONAL
EQUITY(1989).
2 The field of human ecology studies this relationship. See READINGS
IN MAN, THEENVIRONMENT,AND HUMANECOLOGY(A. S. Boughey ed. 1973) (good selection of readings in human
ecology); R. & P. WATSON,MAN AND NATURE(1969) (thoughtful essay).
3 Professor D'Amato criticizes existing theories of equity for depending on "an articulate
link to the imprcovement of the human condition" (i.e., as anthropocentric), rather than on a
moral relationship with nature itself. It is certainly true that In Fairness to Future Generationsis
concerned with equity among generations of the human species. But it is equity with regard to
the care and use of the planet, which is explicitly rooted in the recognition that the human
species is part of the natural system.This implies great respect for the natural system of which we
are a part, but it does not imply that all other living creatures are or should be treated equally.
Rather, the human species, as a part of this natural system, has a special obligation to maintain
the integrity of the planet, so that all generations will be able to enjoy its fruits.
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are dead, and those who are to be born."4 The purpose of hurnan society
must be to realize and protect the welfare and well-being of every generation. This requires sustaining the life-support systems of the planet, the
ecological processes and the environmental conditions necessary for a
healthy and decent human environment.
In this partnership, no generation knows beforehand when it will be the
living generation, how many members it will have, or even how many generations there will ultimately be. It is useful, then, to take the perspective of a
generation that is placed somewhere along the spectrum of time, but does
not know in advance where it will be located.5 Such a generation would want
to inherit the earth in at least as good condition as it has been in for any
previous generation and to have as good access to it as previous generations.
This requires each generation to pass the planet on in no worse condition
than it received it in6 and to provide equitable access to its resources and
benefits. Each generation is thus both a trustee for the planet with obligations to care for it and a beneficiary with rights to use it.
Intergenerational equity calls for equality among generations in the sense
that each generation is entitled to inherit a robust planet that on balance is at
least as good as that of previous generations. This means all generations are
entitled to at least the planetary health that the first generation had.7 In
practice, some generations may improve the environment, with the result
that later generations will inherit a richer and more diverse natural resource
base. In this case, they would be treated better than previous generations.
But this extra benefit would be consistent with intergenerational equity,
because the minimum level of planetary robustness would be sustained and
later generations would not be worse off than previous generations. The
converse is also possible, that later generations would receive a badly degraded environment with major loss of species diversity, in which case they
would be treated worse than previous generations. This latter case would be
contrary to principles of intergenerational equity. Equity among generations provides for a minimum floor for all generations and ensures that each
generation has at least that level of planetary resource base as its ancestors.
This concept is consistent with the implicit premises of trusteeship, stewardship and tenancy, in which the assets must be conserved, not dissipated,
so that they are equally available to those who come after.
The theory of intergenerational equity finds deep roots in international
law.8 The Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights begins,
"Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom,
justice and peace in the world." The reference to all members of the human
4E. BURKE, Reflectionson the Revolution in France 139-40 (1790), in 2 WORKS OF EDMUND
BURKE 368 (London 1854).
5See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
6 See Callahan, What ObligationsDo We Have to Future Generations., in RESPONSIBILITIES TO
FUTURE GENERATIONS 73 (E. Partridge ed. 1981).
7See B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
8
E. BROWN WEISS, supra note 1, at 25-26.
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family has a temporal dimension, which brings all generations within its
scope. The reference to equal and inalienable rights affirms the basic equality of these generations in the human family.
The United Nations Charter, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of
Man, the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
the Declaration on the Rights of the Child and many other human rights
documents protect the dignity of all people and the equality of their rights.
The Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Co-operation
provides in Article 1 that "each culture has a dignity and value which must
be respected and preserved," and that "all cultures form part of the common heritage belonging to mankind." These instruments reveal a fundamental belief in the dignity of all members of human society and in an
equality of rights that extends in time as well as space. Indeed, if we were to
license the present generation to exploit our natural and cultural resources
at the expense of the well-being of future generations, we would contradict
the purposes of the United Nations Charter and internationial human rights
documents.
It is not enough, however, to apply a theory of intergenerational equity
only among generations. It also carries an intragenerational dimension.
When future generations become living generations, they have certain
rights and obligations to use and care for the planet that they can enforce
against one another. Were it otherwise, members of one generation could
allocate the benefits of the world's resources to some communities and the
burdens of caring for it to others and still potentially claim on balance to
have satisfied principles of equity among generations.
Moreover, the fulfillment of intergenerational obligations requires attention to certain aspects of intragenerational equity. As is well-known, poverty
is a primary cause of ecological degradation. Poverty-stricken communities,
which by definition have unequal access to resources, are forced to overexploit the resources they do have so as to satisfy their own basic needs. As an
ecosystem begins to deteriorate, the poor communities suffer most, because
they cannot afford to take the mieasures necessary to control or adapt to the
degradation, or to move to pristine areas.
Thus, to implement intergenerational equity, countries need to help poor
communities to use the natural environment on a sustainable basis, to assist
them in gaining equitable access to the economic benefits from our planet,
such as potable water, and to help protect them from degraded environmental quality. As beneficiaries of the planetary legacy, all members of the
present generation are entitled to equitable access to and use of the legacy.
The future nationals of all countries will benefit from efforts of the present
generation to protect the general planetary environment for future generations. Conversely, all will suffer if the present generation does not make
such efforts.
I have proposed three basic principles of intergenerational equity. First,
each generation should be required to conserve the diversity of the natural
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and cultural resource base, so that it does not unduly restrict the options
available to future generations in solving their problems and satisfying their
own values, and should also be entitled to diversity comparable to that
enjoyed by previous generations. This principle is called "conservation of
options." Second, each generation should be required to maintain the quality of the planet so that it is passed on in no worse condition than that in
which it was received, and should also be entitled to planetary quality comparable to that enjoyed by previous generations. This is the principle of
"conservation of quality." Third, each generation should provide its
members with equitable rights of access to the legacy of past generations and
should conserve this access for future generations. This is the principle of
"conservation of access."
These proposed principles constrain the actions of the present generation
in developing and using the planet, but within these constraints do not
dictate how each generation should manage its resources.
These principles of intergenerational equity form the basis of a set of
intergenerational obligations and rights, or planetary rights and obligations,
that are held by each generation. These rights and obligations derive from
each generation's position as part of the intertemporal entity of human
society.
Planetary rights and obligations are integrally linked. The rights are
always associated with obligations. They are rights of each generation to
receive the planet in no worse condition than did the previous generation, to
inherit comparable diversity in the natural and cultural resource bases, and
to have equitable access to the use and benefits of the legacy. They represent
in the first instance a moral protection of interests, which must be transformed into legal rights and obligations.
Planetary rights and obligations coexist in each generation. In the intergenerational dimension, the generations to which the obligations are owed
are future generations, while the generations with which the rights are
linked are past generations. Thus, the rights of future generations are
linked to the obligations of the present generation. In the intragenerational
context, planetary obligations and rights exist between members of the
present generation. They derive from the intergenerational relationship
that each generation shares with those who have come before and those yet
to come. Thus, intergenerational obligations to conserve the planet flow
from the present generation both to future generations as generations and
to members of the present generation, who have the right to use and enjoy
the planetary legacy.
Intergenerational rights of necessity inhere in all generations, whether
these be immediately successive generations or ones more distant. There is
no theoretical basis for limiting such rights to immediately successive generations. If we were to do so, we would often provide little or no protection to
more distant future generations. Nuclear and hazardous waste disposal, the
loss of biological diversity and ozone depletion, for example, have significant effects on the natural heritage of more distant generations.
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Intergenerational planetary rights may be regarded as group rights, as
distinct from individual rights, in the sense that generations hold these
rights as groups in relation to other generations-past, present and future.9
They exist regardless of the number and identity of individuals making up
each generation. When held by members of the present generation, they
acquire attributes of individual rights in the sense that there are identifiable
interests of individuals that the rights protect. However, those interests
derive from the fact that those living now are members of the present
generation and have rights in relation to other generations to use and
benefit from the planet. The remedies for violations of these rights will
benefit other members of the generation, not only the individual.10
Developments in international law outside the field of the environment
make acceptance of intergenerational rights a natural and desirable evolution. Indeed, international human rights law-the genocide convention,
and the prohibition against racial discrimination, to cite two examples-are
arguably directed as much to the protection of future, as to present, generations. The extinction of, for example, an entire people is more odious in law
than the murder of an equal number of people constituting a minority of
each of several groups. Similarly, discrimination denies an "equal place at
the starting gate" not only to the generation of the suppressed group but (by
implication) also to future generations. Provisions in other human rights
agreements refer to rights of children and of the elderly, and to education
and training, which are implicitly temporally oriented.
One might still ask whether it is not preferable to speak only of planetary
obligations toward future generations without corresponding intergenerational rights. Can intergenerational obligations exist without rights?"1 While
rights are always connected to obligations, the reverse is not always true.
Theoretically, an obligation need not always entail a right. For example, a
moral obligation of charity does not give those who benefit a right to charity. The legal positivist Hans Kelsen hesitated to find a legal right connected
to certain legal obligations.
9 For a thoughtful analysis of group rights in relation to goods that are enjoyed together, see
J. Waldron, Can Communal Goods Be Human Rights? (paper delivered at Conference on
Development, Environment and Peace as New Human Rights, Oxford University, Oxford,
England, May 28-31, 1987).
'0 The temporal dimension may offer a theoretical basis for unifying those human rights that
we now consider to be group or social rights and for so-called new human rights. Groiup rights,
such as cultural rights, have a temporal dimension since the community inherently extends
over time. Theoretically, rights to development, to food, to health, and to the environment can
be seen as intergenerational, or intertemporal, in that they are rights of access of each generation to use and benefit from our natural and cultural resources. See E. BROWN WEISS, supra
note 1,at 114-15.
" Bryan Norton, a philosopher, argues that if one accepts the conceptual model of rights as
limited to individual rights (which he does), it is preferable to recognize general obligations
toward the integrity of environmental systems rather than to discuss environmental protection
in the framework of rights, since this framework cannot encompass such categories as future
generations, whose individual members are still contingent. Norton, EnvironmentalEthics and
the Rights of Future Generations,7 Soc. TIIEORY & PRAC. 319, 337 (1981).
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If the obligated behavior of one individual does not refer to a specifically designated other individual . . . but refers only to the legal community as such, then . . . one is satisfied . . . to assume a legal obligation without a corresponding reflex right: for example in case of the
legal norms that prescribe a certain human behavior toward some animals, plants, or inanimate objects by pain of punishment. It is forbidden
to kill certain animals at certain times (or altogether), to pick certain
flowers, to cut certain trees or to destroy certain historical monuments.
These are obligations which-indirectly-exist
toward the legal community interested in these objects.'2
John Austin described some obligations as absolute duties, which exist independently of any correlative right. He defined absolute duties as those
prescribing actions toward parties other than the one obliged, who are not
determinate persons, such as members generally of an independent society
and mankind at large.'3
If we were to follow this analysis, we would contend that the obligations of
the present generation to future generations constitute obligations or duties
for which there are no correlative rights, because there are no determinate
persons to whom the right attaches. Similarly, in the intragenerational context, obligations to conserve diversity, quality and access would be viewed as
absolute duties for which there is no correlative right.
While this approach may be attractive, it ignores the fundamental temporal relationship that each generation has to all other generations and that
gives rise to the rights of each generation to share equitably in the use of the
planet and its natural resources. These rights focus discussion on the welfare
of generations, what each generation is able to have and to enjoy, in a way
that obligations cannot. If obligations of the present generation are not
linked with rights, the present generation has a strong incentive to bias the
definition of these obligations in favor of itself at the expense of future
generations. Intergenerational rights have greater moral force than do obligations. They provide a basis for protecting the interests of all generations
in a healthy and robust planet.
Professor D'Amato in his essay takes issue with the notion of rights of
future generations to the planet by invoking Derek Parfit's famous paradox
and combining it with the new theory of chaos. He argues that future
generations cannot have rights because they are composed of individuals
who do not exist yet and every intervention we take today to protect the
environment affects the composition of these future individuals, robbing
some potential members of future generations of their existence.
It is important to parse this analysis into its two component parts: that
future generations cannot have rights because the individuals do not exist
yet, and that actions to protect the environment for future generations will
destroy the rights of some future individuals because different people will
be born as a result of the intervention. The first is that future generations
12

H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 62 (M. Knight trans. 1969).
J. AUSTIN, AUSTIN'S JURISPRUDENCE, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 413-15 (1873).

131
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cannot have rights, because rights exist only when there are identifiable
interests, which can only happen if we can identify the individuals who have
interests to protect. Since we cannot know who the individuals in the future
will be, it is not possible for future generations to have rights.
This paradox assumes the traditional conceptual framework of rights as
rights of identifiable individuals. The planetary, or intergenerational, rights
proposed in In Fairness to Future Generationsare not rights possessed by
individuals. They are, instead, generational rights, which must be conceived
of in the temporal context of generations. Generations hold these rights as
groups in relation to other generations-past, present and future. This is
consistent with other approaches to rights, including the Islamic approach,
which treats human rights not only as individual rights, but as "rights of the
community of believers as a whole."'4 They can be evaluated by objective
criteria and indices applied to the planet from one generation to the next.
To evaluate whether the interests represented in planetary rights are being
adequately protected does not depend upon knowing the number or kinds
of individuals that may ultimately exist in any given future generation.
Enforcement of these intergenerational rights is appropriately done by a
guardian or representative of future generations as a group, not of future
individuals, who are of necessity indeterminate. While the holder of the
right may lack the capacity to bring grievances forward and hence depends
upon the representative's decision to do so, this inability does not affect the
existence of the right or the obligation associated with it.
Now it may be argued that such rights do depend upon knowing at least
the number of individuals in the future, because if the earth's population
continues to grow rapidly, the amount of diversity and degree of quality that
must be passed on will be higher than if the population in the future were at
the same level or less than it is today.
But, if anything, the existence of these generational rights to the planet
may constrain the population policies of present and future generations.
Whether a generation chooses to meet its obligations by curtailing exploitation, consumption and waste or by constraining population growth is a
decision it must make. The fact that future generations have a generational
right to receive the planet in a certain condition puts constraints on the
extent to which a present generation can ignore this choice.
The second part to Professor D'Amato's argument is that if we intervene
to conserve the environment to protect future generations, we cannot succeed in protecting them because our intervention will cause a different
group of individuals to emerge. But since the rights of future generations
exist only as generational rights, it does not matter who the individuals are
or how many they may be. Only at the point where the individuals are born
and by definition become members of the present generation do the generational rights attach to individuals.
Professor D'Amato's response is that "[f]uture generations are not an
abstraction; they consist of individuals." But they do not consist of individ14

M. KHADDURI, THE ISLAMIC CONCEPTION OFJUSTICE 233 (1984).
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uals until they are born, and hence it is necessary and appropriate to speak
of future generations qua generations as having rights in relation to the
planet.
Professor D'Amato correctly points out that the composition of future
generations cannot be known in advance, in part because it is affected by
actions of the present generation. Indeed, he does not make his own case as
strongly as he might. For example, we do not need to limit ourselves to
ascribing these effects to subtle changes in the biochemistry of conception,
as Professor D'Amato does in his amusing excursion into the dynamics of
egg and sperm.
Virtually every policy decision of government and business affects the
composition of future generations, whether or not they are taken to ensure
their rights under the guidelines enunciated above. Decisions regarding war
and peace, economic policy, the relative prosperity of different regions and
social groups, transportation, health, education-all influence the demographics and the composition of future generations by affecting the lives
and fortunes of the present generation: who will succeed and prosper, who
will marry whom, who will have children, and even who will emigrate.
In Fairness to Future Generationstakes the view that our planetary obligations to future generations are owed to all the earth's future human inhabitants, whoever they may be. This opens the possibility that these decisions,
too, deserve to be scrutinized from the point of view of their impact on
future generations. Professor D'Amato's approach reflects an unnecessarily
constrained view of human rights law that would shut off a useful and
broadly acceptable theoretical underpinning to sustainable resource development. The possibility that intergenerational equity may place limits on
our actions is an important new area of human rights research.
Such limitations should be applied very narrowly, lest the rights of future
generations develop into an all-purpose club to beat down any and all proposals for change. But surely long-term environmental damage is a good
place to begin. Future generations really do have the right to be assured that
we will not pollute ground water, load lake bottoms with toxic wastes,
extinguish habitats and species or change the world's climate dramatically
-all long-term effects that are difficult or impossible to reverse-unless
there are extremely compelling reasons to do so, reasons that go beyond
mere profitability.
Professor D'Amato invokes chaos theory to justify his contention that any
environmental intervention will produce different individuals in the future
than would otherwise have been produced. But he overlooks the most important implication of chaos theory for the environment and for future
generations: namely, that systems do not proceed on orderly, linear paths of
change, but rather that they will abruptly change.'" This can be demonstrated on a home computer, using a very simple program. It has been
15For catastrophe theory, see R. THOM,
MATHEMATICAL
MODELS OF MORPHOGENESIS
(1983); for the theory of complex systems, see I. PRIGOGINE & I. STENGERS, ORDER OUT OF
CHAOS: MAN'S NEW DIALOGUE WITH NATURE (1984). For a concise review of the influence of
chaos theory, see Chaos Theory:HozvBig ao Advance?, 245 SCIENCE 26 (1989).
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suggested that there may be key breaking points in our global environmental system, beyond which systems will reorganize and substantially change
their properties.'6 If we are concerned about future generations, it is important to try to predict these breaking points. More importantly, the best
tool that we could give future generations to respond to abrupt changes and
reorganizations is a robust planet, which requires conserving a diversity of
resources so that future generations have greater flexibility in designing
responses.
Professor D'Amato proposes that there is a "preverbal sense of morality"
that tells us not to waste resources, degrade the environment or wantonly
kill animals. But, if anything, history in the last few centuries suggests that
our natural instincts are self-indulgent. We have desecrated environments,
wasted resources and slaughtered animals purely for pleasure or for modest
personal gain. It may be that the human species carries both a selfish gene
and an altruistic one, as the sociobiologists tell us,17but it is hardly sufficient
to rely on the generous gene to build a theory of morality to overcome the
selfish genes, without more.
In Fairness to Future Generationsrelies on a fundamental norm of equality
among generations of the human species in relation to the care and use of
the natural system. But it recognizes that we are part of the natural system
and that we, as all other generations, must respect this system. We have a
right to use and enjoy the system but no right to destroy its robustness and
integrity for those who come after us.
Whether we rely on a beneficent "preverbal sense of morality" toward
the planet and its resources or on theories rooted in the welfare of the
human condition and the ecological system of which people are a part, there
is a shared recognition that the present generation has an obligation to care
for the planet and to ensure that all peoples can enjoy its services.
EDITH BROWN WEISS*

OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO FUTURE GENERATIONS
In recent years, lawyers have begun to join ecologists in debating whether
to protect the interests of future
there are-or should be-obligations
generations.' This legal debate was preceded by a philosophical one, dating
back to the early 1970s, on the emergence of a new or "ecological" ethic
16 G. Gallopin, President, Fundacion Bariloche, discussion with author, June 1986. This is
consistent with the scientific paradigms in the theories of catastrophe and of the dynamics of
complex systems far from equilibrium.
7 See, e.g., J. &J. BALDWIN, BEYOND SOCIOBIOLOGY (1981). Sociobiologists assert that there
are four types of inherent behavior that explain all our social behavior: selfish, altruistic,
cooperative and spiteful. Humans act so as to try to ensure that their genes will be carried
forward into succeeding generations. Id. at 49-50.
* Of the Board of Editors.
' For the German-speaking context, see P. SALADIN & C. A. ZENGER, RECHTE KUNFTIGER
(1988).
GENERATIONEN
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